creasing resource base or from reallocating existing resources, die difference be tween Japanese growth rates and those in die rest of the developed world is likely to diminish. Some would add that the contraction of this growth differential is all the more certain given that Japan is approaching technological parity with the countries that it once strove to emulate (Saxonhouse, 1994) . In short, growth-accounting theorists think that tightening resource and technology constraints will overshadow whatever positive influence domestic economic institutions may have on Japan's potential growth rate.
Proponents of the Japanese model find this reasoning too pessimistic and me chanical. They argue that Japan is a special case, with indigenous political and eco nomic institutions that contribute to economic growth in ways not recognised by growth accounting (Johnson, 1982) . In particular, they infer a causal link between the rapid rates of Japanese economic growth after World W ar II (see Figure 1 ) and the distinctive institutions of Japanese capitalism which were emerging at die same time. Since many of those institutions are now fixtures of the Japanese economy, proponents of die model often doubt diat Japanese per capita growth must neces sarily decline over the long run. Among proponents of the model there has been only a limited consensus on the question of which institutions have been most responsible for economic growth. Many mainstream economists have drawn attention to the more unusual properties of Japanese corporate governance and industrial organisation, which they think are well suited to mobilising resources.1 But another influential group has contested that emphasis, arguing that the Japanese state has used industrial policy with ex traordinary dexterity, and that it has successfully identified and supported those in dustries which were essential to growth.2 Although the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is the most conspicuous agent of diese policies, other government agencies, such as die Bank of Japan and die Ministry of Finance, have also played key roles in die planning of economic acdvity.
For at least two reasons, it is those versions of the Japanese model which em phasise die importance of state planning and regulation that warrant the closest scrutiny. First, diey are better known and more influential than most of the indus trial organisation dieories. The state's planning role in post-war Japan is widely ap preciated and admired, particularly among policy-makers from odier (commonly East Asian) countries who seek to replicate Japanese economic history. Second, die state's ability to deliver economic growdi by means of economic planning and regulation has become increasingly contentious. The government's failure to stimulate recovery in die course of the current slowdown seriously undermines many of die claims of its supporters, and die direat of slower growdi over the long term raises strong arguments against a regulated and managed economic system.
The Recent Slowdown
The Japanese model suffered its first serious setback in die early 1990s, when die rate of economic growth suddenly fell. International competitiveness dropped as the real exchange rate appreciated; die financial system was destabilised by the col lapse of asset prices; and conditions in die labour market deteriorated sharply.
Aldiough die causes of die downturn are still debated, monetary factors and speculative behaviour feature prominendy in most explanations. During the late 1980s, stable consumer prices and an appreciating exchange rate produced an ac commodating monetary policy. In contrast to stable consumer price inflation, and in response to die loose monetary policy, asset prices rose substantially. Between January 1987 and December 1989, stock prices on die First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange doubled. Over a similar period, the price of urban land in the six major cities did the same. The eventual correction in asset prices was a substantial one: stock prices fell to 40 per cent of their peak level and, after several years of slow recovery, they have not risen far above that point. At the same time, urban land values have collapsed by 22 per cent since 1990 and diey are yet to reach their nadir.
The problems of unstable asset prices were exacerbated by financial institu tions, which mistook the temporary hike in asset values for a real and permanent shock. On the assumption that asset prices would remain high, financial institutions extended credit on a massive scale to borrowers who offered land as collateral. When the correction in land prices occurred and borrowers defaulted, lenders were left with low-value collateral and bad loans which, even now, are conservatively es timated to be of the order of ¥27 trillion (A$314 billion).
The recent crisis in financial markets underscores the severity of these prob lematic bad loans and it is an embarrassment to admirers of the Japanese model. Previous financial crises -most notably that of 1965 -were dealt with decisively by government and business. The inability of those same parties to deliver similar outcomes in die 1990s is a poor reflection on contemporary Japanese economic management.
The financial crisis has had severe consequences for the personal and nonfinancial corporate sectors. And its recent deepening does not augur well for the future. Those who had borrowed against die value of land have been driven into bankruptcy in large numbers (Figure 2 ), and banks have become much more cau tious in dieir lending policies, pardcularly where individuals and small businesses are concerned (APEG, 1997:50) . This is highly problematic for a country like Ja pan, which relies heavily on small business for its output and employment. A lurdier problem has been die acute drop in international competitiveness. Between 1990 and 1995, die yen appreciated by 25 per cent in real terms. Initially, falling wealth led to a decline in imports, and die current-account surplus expanded (in yen terms) by 42 per cent between 1991 and 1994. The nominal value of die currency was marked up accordingly. Some modest deflation subsequently offset tlie reduction in competitiveness that the nominal appreciation had induced. How ever, die transmission of nominal exchange rate impulses to domcsdc prices in Ja pan is notoriously unreliable (Marston, 1990) , and defladon in the tradable goods sector was not sufficient to restore compeddveness. It has only been in the last few quarters diat depreciation of die currency has allowed exports to contribute sub stantially to growdi. As prospects for die corporate sector worsened, so did condidons in die labour market. At 3.4 per cent, die official unemployment rate may seem low, but it is un derestimated since labour market practices in Japan mean that workers can be idle or virtually unemployed without appearing to be so in the official statistics. Accord ing to McCormack (1997) , if US Bureau of I^abor Standards criteria were used in Japan, the rate of unemployment would be closer to 8.9 per cent. A slack labour market is also suggested by the more closely watched ratio of job offers to seekers, which has a long-run average of 0.88 but is currently at 0.75, and has recendy been as low as 0.6.
Perhaps die most perplexing aspect of diis slowdown is its persistence. This is not only the deepest, but also die longest, slump in post-war Japanese history. The only post-war slowdown of comparable magnitude occurred around die Urne of die first oil shock in 1973. As Figure 3 shows, growdi rebounded much more quickly on diat occasion. For diat reason, and die fact that die Japanese business cycle is not synchronous widi sustained growdi in the rest of the industrialised world, many Japanese commentators are beginning to doubt die flexibility of their economy and die virtues of the model on which it is supposedly founded.
Implications for the Model and the Prospects for Reform
In raising concerns about the inflexibility of die economy, the 1990s slowdown draws attention to die longer-term limits to Japanese growth. Japan's trend rate of growth has actually been easing for some time, and for reasons diat are quite inde pendent of die 1990s malaise. The data summarised in Figure 1 reveal that, after averaging 8.4 per cent between 1950 and 1970, average annual income growdi per head slumped to 4 per cent in die 1970s, and dien 3.4 per cent in the 1980s. Most proponents of die Japanese model missed diis shift of gear. It was not until die 1970s diat die epidiet 'Japan Inc.' gained currency; it was not until 1979 that Ezra Vogel (1979) foretold the arrival of 'Japan as Number O ne'; and, as Saxonhousc (1994) notes, it was not until die mid-1970s diat a clutch of prominent forecasters widi faidi in die model forecast 10 per cent annual Japanese growdi rates for die better part of 20 years.3
By die time diese prophecies had been made, die Japanese economy had in deed become large. But, as growth-accounting theory predicted, by die 1970s and 1980s it was approaching its limits. The manufacturing sector had long been acquir ing under-utilised resources from agriculture. It had also been generating productiv ity growth by absorbing new technology from abroad and it had been rebuilding die nation's war-damaged industrial base widi die most modern forms of capital. By die 1980s, the potential for any further such gains had been largely spent. As a re sult, Japan's ability to achieve exceptional growdi rates was considerably diminished. Now Japan faces an additional set of constraints. Foremost among diem is the country's demographic profile. Japan is one of the most rapidly ageing industrial ised economies: its working-age population will decline by a net 4.6m workers in the first two decades of the 21st century. By 2015 one-quarter of die population will be aged over 65, and by 2049 that proportion will have risen to one-third (see Figure  4) .
The most obvious problem associated with an aging population is a tightening labour supply constraint. To deal with this problem, the Japanese parliament is currendy debating reforms to die tax system which will improve die access of women to die workforce, and it has already strengthened die provisions of long standing, but previously unenforced, equal employment opportunity legisladon gov erning overtime. In order to encourage greater workforce participadon among die elderly, social security reform is also being debated. Besides lacing a diminishing labour supply, Japan is likely to experience lower savings rates as a result of its aging populadon. Aging implies a rising dependency rado, which will inflate expenditure on social security for die elderly and uldmately increase the tax burden. Furthermore, since die elderly often have a high average propensity to consume, die rising proportion of diem in die populadon will put downward pressure on aggregate savings rates. T o die extent diat internadonal capi tal mobility is imperfect, bodi of diese consideradons imply that Japan will have a smaller pool of savings on which to draw for future investment.4 II history offers any guidance, die produedvity slowdown of recent years and die diminishing pool of savings arc likely to matter more than the tightening of die la-bour supply constraint.5 Growth accounting studies usually indicate that Japan's growth has been driven more by productivity and capital accumulation than by ris ing labour inputs (Kim & l.au, 1994; Drysdale & Huang, 1997; Denison & Chung, 1976) .
Liberal financial markets are increasingly being seen as a way of managing the problem. Although financial deregulation has been in progress for about 17 years,6 it was radically accelerated in November 1996 when Prime Minister Hashimoto announced a major overhaul of the financial system. This program was simultane ously a response to the belief that the existing regulated financial structure was per forming badly and an explicit response to the long-run problems presented by aging (Economic Council, 1996) . The program foreshadows further deregulation of the securities industry, changes to die Bank of Japan Law, more deregulation of the system under which foreign-exchange earnings are currendy repatriated, and exten sive reforms of die life insurance and funds management industries.
These initiatives go against die grain of die Japanese model, every variant of which endorses financial repression. The basic argument is diat the Japanese state Successfully set a ceiling on interest rates on private savings accounts over much of the post-war period, in order to minimise die cost of capital to industry and so promote growth (Zysman, 1983:248) . The policy was effective pardy because sav ings were supplied inelastically and pardy because favourable tax treatment of diem ensured reasonable effective rates of return (Hamada & Horiuchi, 1987) . If this was ever a good policy framework, it is certainly not appropriate now. The retire ment of die current cohort of workers will have to be funded in some way. If social security and taxes arc not to be die solution, dien it is essential dial die returns on private savings (including pension contributions) be maximised. That is why more efficient and competitive financial markets are currendy being promoted.
The transition to a less regulated financial system is certain to deprive die state of some very important tools in economic planning. Already, financial deregulation has deprived die monetary audiorities of dicir capacity to promote favoured indus tries through die application of 'window guidance'. This form of suasion was once an important means by which die audiorities encouraged banks to lend to certain government-targeted industries, and it was exercised when large private banks bor rowed from the Bank of Japan's discount window (a course of action to which they were regularly compelled when die financial system was tighdy controlled). The practice has now fallen into disuse simply because, in liberal capital markets, banks no longer depend on die discount facility, and die leverage of die monetary authorities over die banks in relation to the direction of bank lending has lessened.
There is also die possibility diat die state will eventually forfeit much of its con trol over die direction of capital as a result of die unravelling of die extensive system 5 Histoiy may not be our most reliable guide. International capital mobility is now much higher than it was in the earlier post-war years, and domestic savings ratios may therefore prove less essential to Japanese capital accumulation in the future. 6 Takeda and Turner (1992) provide an excellent summary of the process in its earlier phases.
of state financial institutions. To date, regulation of the financial system has been configured to gamer for die state a high proportion of personal savings: approxi mately 20 per cent of household savings are held through the state-run postal sav ings system -making it the largest system of socialised savings in die world. These funds are channelled to industries and aedvides which die state favours dirough a large network of state-operated financial insdtudons. Recendy, die uses to which these funds are being put have been fiercely cridcised from widiin die financial community and even from widiin die bureaucracy. The Minister for Health and Welfare has called for die privadsadon of die postal savings system, publicly com plaining diat the Ministry of Finance does not earn enough on its investments. In large measure, die system performs poorly because die funds diat it accumulates are channelled into industries in which Japan has a gross comparadve disadvantage and which generate low rates of return (Calder, 1993:107) .
This inability on the part of state-operated financial insdtudons to support highgrowdi sectors epitomises die more general tendency of die state to pursue indus trial policies diat retard, radier dian facilitate, structural adjustment. Although in dustrial policy has had many successes in Japan, there are many more cases of min istries having failed to discern which industries consdtute die essence of Japan's comparadve advantage. The failure of key secdons of die bureaucracy to support die automotive and consumer electronics industries in die early post-war period are cases in point. At die same dine, industrial policy has vigorously supported indus tries which have very limited growdi potendal; die most notorious examples are die provision of subsidised state finance to mining and agriculture.
Aldiough recent governments have defended die role of state-run financial insd tudons in die face of moundng opposidon, diere is evidence diat die dde of opinion is moving against conservadve interests. Prime Minister Hashimoto has conceded diat the public sector ought not to be exempt from die financial reform process (77lc Nikkei Weekly, 27 January 1997). More tellingly, policy circles have recog nised dial open capital markets could assume a greater role in influencing die course of industrial development. Reforms undertaken so far include die easing of eligibility requirements for lisdng on stock exchanges, die creadon of new over-diecounter markets for firms widi a strong research and development orientadon, and dereguladon of die eligibility requirements for die issuance of bonds. In addidon, one of the purposes of die reform to Article 9 of die And-Monopoly Law is to pro vide large firms widi incendves to form small subsidiary corporadons diat undertake research and development.
The government's change of atdtude towards industrial policy is also reflected in its formal planning process. Government plans used to idendfy diose sectors which were to be promoted widi public resources and reguladon. More recendy, diey have acknowledged die ability of markets to idendfy and promote promising industries. The most recent report of die Economic Planning Agencey (EPA) has earmarked few industries for support and it has stressed die importance of sweeping dereguladon. Significandy, even where it did endorse die government's role in promodng certain industries, die plan idendlied dereguladon of die operadng envi-ronments of those industries as a priority. Most important, the announcement of a financial reform package in November 1996 has been followed with an announce ment that the Hashimoto cabinet has adopted 2,823 individual deregulatory meas ures governing areas including energy, welfare, transport, telecommunications and real estate.
Private-sector lobby groups have endorsed deregulation. The peak Japanese employer body, Kcidanren, has been actively demanding it and has insisted that the real appreciation of the yen needs to be met with measures that reduce factor prices. In many cases, this means deregulating factor markets. Significantly, Keidanren rarely calls for increased levels of protection. In fact, in late 1996 it pre sented the government with a list of 699 proposed deregulatory measures. Simi larly, private bankers have backed demands for the dismantling of the national sav ings system. Apart from objecting to the fact that the system prices and allocates capital inefficiently, bankers complain that existing regulations give the government an unwarranted advantage in relation to deposit collection and so crowd them out of their principal factor market. This, they claim, is a particularly serious problem given that the banking system is experiencing extreme difficulties.
The arguments advanced by Kcidanren and private bankers share a common motivation in Japan's recent economic misfortunes. Bankers argue that the current problems of the financial system need to be addressed now, and with a fundamental change of philosophy about the role of the state in the allocation of capital. Analo gously, manufacturers, who face a high cost structure and a recessed domestic economy, present strong arguments that economic recovery hinges upon less state intervention in their affairs. Both sets of arguments dovetail with the longer-term pressures for economic reform. They show that while many deregulatory initiatives are motivated by the problems that Japan faces as it ages and reaches economic ma turity, it is the current slowdown which furnishes reformers with a mandate for im mediate deregulation.
Conclusions
The Japanese model has been strained by two simultaneous developments. The prolonged 1990s slowdown has shown that the economy is not immune from deepseated stagnation. More fundamentally, long-term constraints on growth are in creasingly apparent, and market-oriented reforms arc widely accepted as the appro priate response.
These developments discredit the Japanese model in two ways. First, events have simply overtaken the forecasts it produced. Japan has failed to meet the ex pectations that were held for it 20 years ago by advocates of the model. By contrast, the better growth-accounting studies, which eschewed Japanese exceptionalism, have aged extremely well. For instance, die landmark study by Denison and Chung (1976) predicted a post-2002 long-run growtii rate of 3.2 per cent. This fits with the EPA's recent forecast of a 3.0 per cent average annual growtii between 1997 and 2000. It is certainly nearer the mark dian die optimistic projections diat were issued in the mid-1970s by proponents of die Japanese model.
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The second sense in which the Japanese model has been discredited goes more to the heart of its assumptions. It is damaging enough that its forecasts of high and durable growth should have been invalidated so comprehensively. More serious are die failures of the institutions that were central to those forecasts. In forecasting 3 per cent annual real growth, the EPA (1997:34) warned that such a modest aspira tion would be realised only if a program of appropriate deregulation and reform were implemented. Otherwise, growth would be no more than 1.8 per cent. That reform should be promoted by the very government bureaucrats who nurtured the formation of industrial policy is a telling indictment of theories which uphold the managerial capabilities of the state.
Yet despite history's rough handling of the Japanese model, and despite the current slowdown, the outlook for Japanese growth is not entirely grim. Many re cent and planned reforms will undoubtedly produce a more efficient allocation of resources and relax constraints on the availability of capital and labour. Moreover, although Japan has surpassed the West in technology in many areas, in others it is still within the frontier, and so there remains unexploited potential for further pro ductivity growth. For instance, Japan has been slow to join the latest revolutions in telecommunications and computing. However, over the next few years these indus tries are certain to contribute significantly to productivity.
